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Available online 22 February 2014The long-term economics of mitigating climate change over the long run has played a high
profile role in the most important analyses of climate change in the last decade, namely the
Stern Report and the IPCC's Fourth Assessment. However, the various kinds of uncertainties
that affect these economic results raise serious questions about whether or not the net costs
and benefits of mitigating climate change over periods as long as 50 to 100 years can be known
to such a level of accuracy that they should be reported to policymakers and the public. This
paper provides a detailed analysis of the derivation of these estimates of the long-term
economic costs and benefits of mitigation. It particularly focuses on the role of technological
change, especially for energy efficiency technologies, in making the net economic results of
mitigating climate change unknowable over the long run.
Because of these serious technical problems, policymakers should not base climate change
mitigation policy on the estimated net economic impacts computed by integrated assessment
models. Rather, mitigation policies must be forcefully implemented anyway given the actual
physical climate change crisis, in spite of the many uncertainties involved in trying to predict
the net economics of doing so.
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Over the past 10 years, dozens of articles, reports, and
papers have addressed the economics of mitigating climate
change. As one might expect, both the quantitative results
and the computational models that produced them have
changed somewhat, though not dramatically, over time.
During that decade, the negative impacts of climate change
on the physical world have become more frequent, and
most proposed climate mitigation targets have become more
stringent. Today, the generally accepted temperature target,
to which most governments agree, would limit the increase
in temperature due to greenhouse gas emissions derived from
human-related activities to 2 °C, relative to pre-industrial
times, by 2100. As years pass, the time remaining to meetThis is anopenaccess article unthat target decreases. Furthermore, the costs of mitigating
climate changewill tend to increase ifmitigation is delayed and
if future energy technology costs and performance character-
istics follow current forecasts, although forecasts of some of
these important parameters have changed significantly over
the last 10 years. Of course, the actual prices of the fossil fuels
that climate change mitigation would displace have also
changed in this time, even more than the long-run forecasts
of future fuel prices, raising interesting questions about the
current forecasts.
The best and most recent comprehensive reviews of the
economics of mitigating climate change appeared in the
Working Group III report of the Fourth Climate Assessment of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and
the 6, sponsored by the British government [1,2]. Since both
reports were published in 2007, the underlying research
would have been undertaken prior to or during 2006, making
both studies somewhat out-of-date already. However,der theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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them here. The economic modeling efforts for analyzing
climate change mitigation for the upcoming Fifth IPCC Climate
Assessment, due in spring 2014, are basically now complete,
though many of the new results have yet to be published. It is,
therefore, particularly timely to re-assess the state of the art in
estimating the net benefits or costs of mitigating climate
change over the next 100 years and, moreover, to discuss the
scientific rigor and the political relevance of these studies.
One of the key aspects of these prominent reviews
was their discussions of the many uncertainties inherent in
estimating the net benefits or costs of mitigating climate
change by 2100. In addition, several inter-model comparison
exercises for IAMs have been carried out since 2006 to try to
understand better the basis for the different economic results
for mitigation that different computer models and research
teams have produced [3,4]. Barker [5] and Kuik et al. [6], as
well as the Energy Modeling Forum #25 report, discussed
much of the research into how to achieve fairly strict global
climate mitigation scenarios, such as the 2 °C target [5–7].
But the most comprehensive statistical analysis of the net
benefit/cost results for climate change mitigation of which we
are aware appeared in Barker [8], on which both the Stern
Review and theWorking Group III report heavily relied [8,2,1].
Thus, it is important to review carefully the Barker [8] meta-
analysis of the economic results for a very large number of
mitigation scenarios. These results were also discussed at some
length relative to the key issue of uncertainty in Pearce et al.
[12].
At this point in the evolution of trying to estimate the
net benefits or costs of mitigating human-induced climate
change through 2100, we should ask how our understanding
of these estimates has evolved since 2006, if it has, and what
we now really know. This question is particularly important
in considering the stricter mitigation scenarios that are
consistent with limiting the temperature increase to less
than 2 °C over this century because most governments have
committed to achieving that goal, at least formally. However,
most have not, in fact, done much to achieve it. This paper,
therefore, will primarily address three questions:
1 Has there been much, or any, progress made in producing
reasonably accurate net benefit or cost estimates for mitigat-
ing climate change over the next century since 2006, or even
before 2006?
2 Is progress even theoretically possible, especially in light of
likely changes in the cost and operating parameters of both
supply and demand-side technologies?
3 What should we substitute for economic forecasts to lay a
more profound basis for decision-making?
The analytical context for addressing these vexing questions
is the large number of fundamental uncertainties inherent in
attempting to make such projections. Many of these uncer-
tainties reflect what are often called deep or radical uncer-
tainties, which further research today cannot resolve for the
long-term future [9,10]. As is the case in most complex systems,
forecasts are highly uncertain in a scientific sense after a fairly
short initial period, just as daily weather forecasts are unknow-
able for a month, or even less. However, most integrated
assessment models used to analyze the economics of climate
change have hundreds of input parameters, each of which ishighly uncertain in the long run. Thus, this review of the past
attempts to determine the economics of climate change
mitigation over the long run leads directly to the hypothesis
that the net benefits or costs are unknowable because of the
many deep uncertainties involved [11,12]. When preparing
decision-making, we must also take into consideration the
fact that mitigation scenarios are not small perturbations
on easily forecastable baseline scenarios, where linear “first
order” differences would dominate. Rather, mitigation scenar-
ios represent major transformations of the economy relative
to baseline scenarios and, thus, represent large and highly
non-linear changes that will strongly impact the develop-
ment of new energy technologies on both the supply and
demand sides, as well as other relevant technologies that offset
greenhouse gas emissionsworldwide. However, falsely claiming
to know that a 100-year analysis of the economics of mitigating
climate change shows “net costs” of X percent of gross domestic
product (GDP), plus or minus some error bar, only serves to
scare off politicians and other policymakers from doing much
to mitigate climate change. Almost always, “net costs” are
reported, not net economic benefits. Consequently, decisions for
climate change are not popular, and politicians try to avoid this
topic in election campaigns. Further, such a claim would serve
no scientific purpose since we cannot know if it is true.
Regardless, committing to embarking on a vigorous campaign
to mitigate climate change is fundamentally a moral issue, not
a long-run economic issue. Claiming that this imperative can
be based on projections working with incremental changes
undervalues the importance of radical changes. The global
mitigation pathway pursued at any specific time can and
should be adjusted every few years as we learnmore about the
short- to medium-term science, technology, and economics.
Businesses use just such a procedure when applying the
technique of scenario-planning.
In light of this conclusion, we will ask what changes, if any,
should be made in how this research is presented in the
upcoming Fifth IPCC Climate Assessment, andwewill discuss the
policy implications that could result frommisunderstanding this
research. Many other types of results, not just net costs in the
long-run, are often reported in the climate mitigation literature
with much greater certainty than is scientifically justified. Such
results include the mix of energy supplies optimal by 2050 or
2100 and the net costs of not including newnuclear plants or CCS
facilities in the mix, among others. Our analysis concludes that
we should stop trying to assess the long-run economics of
mitigating climate change since that is unknowable. Instead,
modeling work on the economics of mitigating climate change
should focus on the details of how to mitigate climate change,
beginning now, in away thatminimizes costs andmaximizes the
well-being of all people on our fragile planet over the short to
medium term and, thus, how to create relevant normative
scenarios. Such models will help to backcast from the desired
normative scenario to the present and describe the pathways to
this desired future.
2. Three key aspects of integrated assessment models
Since almost all the recent assessments of the economics of
climate change have relied on “integrated assessment models”
(IAMs), this paper will focus on enhancing our understanding
of how those models typically calculate the net benefits and
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level, IAMs attempt to couple a representation of the world's
economic systems to its energy- and land-use systems for
about a dozen regions of the world in order to calculate how
greenhouse gas emissions are likely to change as the magni-
tude and structure of the economy changes. The models then
couple these projections of greenhouse gas emissions into the
atmosphere, biomass, and oceans to simple climate change
assessment models that yield likely temperature increases for
any given future year.
Of course, other review articles have previously covered
some of these topics, but relatively few inter-model compar-
isons at either the theoretical or the empirical level have
appeared in the climate change literature. Barker [8] reviews
the history of much of the inter-IAM comparison literature,
and Edenhofer et al. [3] compare aspects of five “global
energy–environment–economy models” [8,3]. In addition,
Professor Stephen DeCanio's book Economic Models of Climate
Change (2003) addresses a variety of issues, especially the
economic theories that underlie the equations in the macro-
economic modules [13]. Since this book does a fairly complete
job of reviewing the theoretical validity of themacro-economic
modules all IAMs contain, we will not address those issues
pertaining to the second point above any further.1 However,
we will address the question of whether IAMs can adequately
model the economics of future energy efficiency enhance-
ments, since increasing the efficiency of energy end-use
technologies (the demand side of the energy economy) over
the long run is a crucial policy option for mitigating climate
change, if not the crucial option.
Another theoretical aspect of computing the net economic
benefits of mitigating climate change is the fact that all
IAMs assume that some sort of idealized equilibrium for the
economy (or at least for certain energy technology markets)
will be achieved in each year for which results are computed.
That assumption implies that any non-equilibrium state in the
same year would be more costly to the economy since, by
definition, it would not represent a “least-cost” (or maximum
utility) state of affairs as defined by the model. Yet the
real-world economy is never in a perfect equilibrium (or even
close to it), especially in the base year from which all model
calculations for the future begin. Thus, if all cost-effective
investments in new energy-consuming or supply technologies
had been made in the model's base year, they already would
have significantly reduced the future net costs of mitigating
climate change. The assumption inherent inmost IAMs that the
base year, as well as future years, had already achieved an
economic optimummay, then, tends to overstate the net costs
and underestimate the net benefits of achieving the necessary
level of mitigation relative to where the energy economy
actually stands today.2 For example, many “bottom-up” studies
of energy-efficiency investments claim that many such invest-
ments could be made at net negative costs today – i.e. net
benefits – to reduce greenhouse gas emissions [7].
Moreover, this paper will not delve into the issue of the
incremental ecological and other damages that are avoided1 See also the critique in Barker [8], page 11, on the use of aggregated
production functions used in climate-related IAMs [8].
2 Some IAMs assume lag time for technology implementation to
equilibrium levels.by mitigating climate change to a specified level relative to
a base or reference case set of damages. (The scholarly
discussion of the trade-offs between different environmental
impacts, known as Life Cycle Assessment, is not included
either.) The topic of damages is important, but none of the
previous damage functions incorporated into IAMs seem to
have much basis in fact [14–16]. There seems to be little
evidence to support their mathematical form or magnitude
[17]. However, surprisingly, most IAMs discussed in Barker
[8] and relied on by the 2007 IPCC report do not include any
estimates of the likely future damage due to climate change
at all [8,1]. Because no reasonable damage estimates have
been incorporated into most IAM results, and because there
is tremendous uncertainty inherent in even trying to make
monetized estimates of damages that have yet to happen on
a global scale, it is very hard to estimate, even roughly, the
net benefits of mitigating climate change in the long run. Yet,
as Dr. Stern has stressed recently, the damages caused by
climate change could be very large [18].
This paper will consider three aspects of existing IAMs:
1) their overall structure and level of technological disaggre-
gation, 2) the economic theory that determines each key
equation within this structure, and 3) the input assumptions,
both historic and future, for key parameters within these
equations, including those that apply to new technologies.
These topics will be treated solely from the perspective of how
they affect the calculation of the net benefits and costs of
mitigating climate change and the usefulness of these results to
policymakers who are trying to significantly mitigate climate
change.
3. To what should the costs of a mitigation scenario
be compared?
To calculate the net benefits or costs of mitigating climate
change, wemust compare two scenarios. Most studies compare
the net costs of a “reference” or “baseline” case to the net costs
of a mitigation case, such as a scenario in which the global
temperature increase is limited to 2 °C by 2100. The construc-
tion of the reference case usually only assumes that no new
climate mitigation policies are implemented beyond those in
place today. Conceptually, then, the reference case represents
the costs to society thatwould actually result if the current level
of climate change mitigation policies were maintained.
But there is a major problemwith this approach. Integrated
assessment modelers (and models) cannot forecast with
reasonable accuracy what would actually happen to the
trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions if no new mitigation
policies were adopted worldwide over the next 50–100 years.
In particular, failing implementation of new climate change
mitigation policies, there might be a major economic crisis
caused by climate change that causes the trajectory of GDP, or
other economic indicators, to deviate substantially from the
assumed projections. But integrated assessment modelers
never model feedback between the amount of climate change
and economic growth and would have an extremely difficult
time doing so if they tried. The economy in a reference case
could also begin to collapse because of the depletion of fossil
fuel reserves, or because of a financial crisis. But even without
considering climate change or resource depletion, no econo-
mist could possibly forecast the global economy for the next
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policymaking. Because forecasting the future of the energy
economy for the next 50–100 years is impossible (not just
difficult), there is no valid baseline emissions scenario towhich
the costs of a mitigation scenario can be compared. It is not
even clear that, in general, economic forecasts for only the next
10–20 years can be relied on for policy purposes.
It is not surprising then, that when different models
compare the net costs or benefits of mitigating climate
change, the models and modeling teams end up using a very
wide range of greenhouse gas emissions trajectories as their
reference case [1, Fig. 3.8 (page 187)]. This reflects, in part,
the tremendous uncertainty of making 50–100 year econom-
ic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts. The uncertainties
reflect both the uncertainty in the underlying economic
(GDP) forecasts as well as the uncertainties associated with
how the assumed internal operating parameters and costs
of dozens of energy supply and demand technologies will
change over the long run in this scenario. Thus, one cannot
simply compare the net costs of mitigating climate change
across different model results without explicitly accounting
for the differing emissions trajectories of the reference cases.
For example, if two models develop a mitigation scenario
for the same level of temperature increase in 2100, but one
model needs to reduce average emissions by 50%more than the
other relative to their reference cases during the 2005–2100
period, then one would expect the net costs of mitigating this
higher level of reference case emissions to be more than 50%
higher in order to achieve the same final mitigation scenario.
(The net costswould probably bemore than 50% higher because
the net marginal costs of mitigation tend to increase the greater
the mitigation requirement.) In conclusion, right from the
beginning, if the research community cannot even develop a
reasonably accurate reference case with very limited uncertain-
ty over the next 100 years, then the net long-run costs of
mitigating climate change cannot be calculated, since they are
derived by identifying the usually small differences in costs
between the reference case and mitigation case scenarios.3 Yet,
doing so is impossible for all the reasons stated above.
4. The Stern Review and its meta-analysis of IAM net
cost results
Section 10.2 of the 2007 Stern Review covers the results
from other models regarding the costs of emission-saving
measures. The review lists many requirements of an adequate
IAM methodology for computing the net costs and benefits of
mitigation [2]. It says that a broad assessment of net costs
“requires a thorough modeling of consumer and producer
behavior, aswell as the cost and choice of low-GHG [greenhouse
gas] technologies” (page 268). It goes on to say, “To estimate
how costs can be kept as low as possible, models should cover a
broad range of sectors and gases, as mitigation can take many
forms, including [reducing] land-use and industrial-process
emissions. Most models, however, are restricted to estimating
the cost of altered fossil-fuel combustion applied mostly to3 Small differences between any two types of forecasts, such as forecasts
of net costs for two different scenarios, are subject to greater error than
either of the separate forecasts from which the differences are derived,
especially when the sign of the difference is not even known.carbon, as this reduces model complexity. Although fossil-fuel
combustion accounts for three-quarters of developed econo-
mies' carbon emissions, this simplifying assumptionwill tend to
over-estimate costs, as many low-cost mitigation opportunities
in other sectors are left out (for example, energy efficiency,
non-CO2 emissions mitigation in general, and reduced emis-
sions from deforestation) ….” (page 269). The Stern Review
then lists the key model comparison studies carried out in, or
recently before, 2006 and comments that “the wide range of
model results reflects the design of the models and their choice
of assumptions, which itself reflects the uncertainties and
differing approaches inherent in projecting the future” (page
269).
To get a better sense of the kinds of uncertainties the
Stern Review fails to address, we will first critique the
meta-analysis of IAM-generated cost projections carried out
by Barker [8] that the Stern Review itself commissioned [8].
This meta-analysis seems to have provided the primary basis
for the Stern Review's conclusion that the net costs/benefits
of mitigating climate change (on a present-value basis) by
2050 probably lie in the range of a cumulative loss of GDP of
1%, plus or minus 3%, by 2050. This appears to be quite a wide
range compared to the central value, and it allows for the
possibility that growth in GDP could be at least as high as 2%
more in the mitigation scenario than in the reference case, or
4% lower. On the other hand, since even +2% in cumulative
GDP growth over 40–45 years is only about +0.05% per year,
on average, we see that the entire range of results cited by
both Barker [8] and Stern is, in fact, extremely small relative
to average historical global GDP growth rates, which were in
the 2–3% per year range. Anyone who is aware of typical
inaccuracies in making economic forecasts, even over the
short run, would assume that the cumulative uncertainty in
such estimates in the long run would be vastly greater than
the average annual value of 0.05% in the results cited in the
Stern Report [2].4
Fortunately, and usefully, the Barker review reports sepa-
rate inter-model comparison results for net costs grouped by
the level of CO2 reductions in the atmosphere achieved in the
future. It demonstrates the intuitive result, noted above, that
the likely net costs of mitigation are much lower when smaller
reductions in CO2 emissions are needed. These results, as
segregated by the mitigation level achieved, are, however,
presumably averaged over the very wide range of baseline or
reference scenarios that appear in Table 5 [8, page 20]. For
example, Table 5 shows that the cumulative net cost in terms of
reduction of GWP (global GDP) for the strictest mitigation
scenario of 450 ppm of CO2 in the atmosphere averages 3.1%.
However, since this result for the mitigation scenario presum-
ably is averaged pairwise over a wide range of baseline
scenarios, we cannot tell what the net cost might be per
percentage point of reduction of CO2 from a specified baseline.
It is surprising that the Barker study does not report the results
in this way, given that one of the independent variables in the
regression analysis performed is “CO2 change from baseline4 The precise Barker [8] results from Table 4 for all 1335 scenarios and
model runs included a net cumulative GDP loss of 0.9%, plus or minus one
standard deviation of 2.0% (page 19) [8]. Clearly, one might wonder why the
spread in the cumulative cost results over 40–45 years is so small when
expressed on an annual basis.
5 Note that here Barker [8] explicitly supports our earlier point, namely,
that the net costs of mitigation will depend to some degree on the emissions
level of the reference case utilized by each modeling team as well as that of
the mitigation scenario [8].
6 The cost of a “backstop technology” equals the long-term cost of a liquid
fuel substitute for a current liquid fuel such as gasoline.
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reduction in GWP goes along with an average reduction of CO2
by 47.9%, but it would have been more precise and interesting
to see how the net benefits and costs varied by the percentage
reduction in CO2 based on each reference case/mitigation case
pair. One can only assume that reporting the results this way
would have greatly reduced the standard deviation of 6% listed
for the net costs of this sub-category of mitigation scenarios.
Of course, the reason it would probably be more instructive
if the net cost results were reported in terms of percentage of
CO2 reduction is that, to first approximation, the total net costs
of mitigation equal the amount of CO2 mitigated (in tonnes,
not percent) times the average cost per tonne to reduce CO2
emissions. Thus,while “percent CO2 reduction” is not equivalent
to tonnes, it is probably better to include it as a denominator for
the results, rather than just reviewing results in terms of the
final absolute CO2 level achieved in the atmosphere without
any attention paid to the starting or reference levels in the
atmosphere. But in general, the cost per tonne of emission
reductions will likely vary with the absolute level of baseline
emissions, as well as with the mitigation level achieved, so
including an independent variable for both the absolute baseline
emissions level and the tonnes of CO2 reduction from that level
would probably improve the statistical properties of the Barker
regression equation. This approach would be mathematically
identical to including both the absolute baseline emissions
level and the absolute mitigation scenario emissions level as
independent variables. Either way, it is especially clear from the
huge variation in baseline CO2 emissions depicted in Barker Fig.
1 that any meta-analysis of the economic impacts of mitigation
should account for both the baseline and mitigation levels of
CO2 emissions as directly as possible.
The next question is the role that the average cost of
mitigating a single tonne of CO2 plays in Barker's meta-analysis
of total net costs. If one model or modeling team assumed very
different marginal mitigation costs per tonne of CO2 than
another team, then the total net costs of mitigation between
these two models would vary significantly for this reason
alone. Themarginalmitigation costs per tonne of CO2 could vary
significantly from one scenario to another if different modeling
teams assumed very different capital investment costs per unit
of low-carbon energy generation capacity, e.g., wind generators
or nuclear power plants, and different discount rates. But the
capital investment costs of low-carbon generation capacity are a
component of the gross costs of mitigation, not the net costs. To
derive net mitigation costs, one must subtract from the gross
costs ofmitigation thebenefit of not providing the same amount
of energy from a higher-carbon energy source in the reference
case, namely, from a source that the new low-carbon source
would displace. For example, additional investment in en-
hanced energy-efficiency technologies might have a gross
cost of $100 per tonne of CO2 emissions reductions, but that
technologymight displace coal-based electric generationwith a
gross cost of $150 per tonne. Thus, in this case, therewould be a
net savings of mitigation of $50 per tonne of CO2 mitigation, a
clear economic benefit. To calculate the net costs or benefits of
mitigation, two sets of gross costs from the different scenarios
must be taken into account: the costs of the lower-carbon
emitting technology from the mitigation case and the costs
of the displaced higher-carbon emitting technology from the
reference case that can be substituted. Modeling teams need, ofcourse, tomake assumptions about both sets of costs separately,
for the reference and for mitigation cases for 50–90 years into
the future.
The next logical question becomes whether the Barker
meta-analysis adjusted statistically for differences in the net
costs for a single unit of CO2 reduction to help account for
the total differences in net costs for the “same” scenarios as
reported by various modeling teams. To answer this, we
reviewed Section 4.2 of Barker's paper titled “Reasons for
Differences in theModel Results” [8, pages 25–27]. Section 4.2.3
specifically claims to address model “assumptions” and states,
“[T]he wide range of predicted values may depend critically on
the structural assumptions of themodels, including the baseline
scenarios, sectoral and regional detail, substitution possibilities,
international capital mobility, economies of scale, environmen-
tal damages and benefits, and the discount rate.” While this is
correct, it is curious that Barker's list of important assumptions
does not include what we would call “non-structural assump-
tions,” including the numerical values of key input assumptions
needed in all IAMs, e.g., the capital costs and operating
parameters of new low-carbon electricity generators and other
technologies.5 In fact, one can see from reviewing Barker's
Appendix A that the multi-variate regression analysis included
independent structural variables for “number of regions,”
“number of sectors,” “number of fuel sectors/types,” and the
presence of a “backstop technology.” But the Barker analysis
appears to have completely omitted any consideration of the
potentially more important gross cost parameters associated
with the fossil fuels and assumed backstop technologies as
independent variables.6
Any statistical meta-analysis that attempts to explain the
net cost differences obtained by different modeling teams for
different scenarios must include these gross cost parameters
because the total net cost differences depend directly on the
gross costs of each energy technology modeled. In contrast,
the number of energy technologies modeled may not have
much impact on the net costs, particularly if the technologies
have very similar gross costs, or if some widely available
technologies dominate the technological change during the
course of a scenario. In reviewing the definitions of the
independent variables used in the Barker meta-analysis, we
find that Table A1 lists 15 independent variables, but none of
these variables have any type of direct gross cost factored
into its quantification. Ironically, we can conclude that
Barker's meta-analysis [8] relies on a regression equation
that tries to explain net cost (net GWP) differences using
almost purely structural descriptions of the models relied on
to generate those costs, while not including as independent
variables the actual gross technology cost assumptions that
are clearly more directly relevant from a theoretical perspec-
tive. Specifically, if all the cost input assumptions run for a
single reference case andmitigation case by a given IAMwere
precisely doubled, then the net cost difference for the GWP
obtained by comparing these scenarios would approximately
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new technologies in each type of scenario are of primary
importance for statistically “explaining” net cost differences
between the scenarios in a meta-analysis, not necessarily the
structural differences in the models.
Is there any other reason why the omission of any
cost-based independent variable is a major problem for the
Barker analysis and the Stern Review, as well as for our
further understanding of the net costs of mitigating climate
change? Yes. The meta-analysis, which depends on results
derived from a multi-variate regression analysis of hundreds
of IAM results, cannot possibly be even close to accurate if
it omits other types of variables (cost-based, in this case)
that are theoretically essential to calculating the result being
analyzed. When performing a regression analysis, all inde-
pendent variables that are theoretically essential for deriving
the result, whether highly significant or not, must be included
for the analysis to be valid.8 Thus, the basic results of the Barker
meta-analysis of net costs for mitigating climate change, as
cited in Tables 4 and 5, including those relied on by the Stern
Review, must be taken to be invalid [14]. One thing thatwe can
conclude with certainty about the Barker [8] meta-analysis is
that the inclusion of additional theoretically relevant indepen-
dent variables would significantly reduce both the scatter or
standard errors of the equations and the results for the
standard deviation in terms of percent difference in GWP due
to mitigation. However, what would happen to the predicted
values for the dependent variable “percent change GWP” due
to mitigation for any particular set of input assumptions is
unknown.
This critique of the Barker meta-analysis leads to the
question of which IAM results are likely to be more accurate
than the others and which sets of numerical values for the
many input assumptions these models require are the most
likely to occur in the future. But is this really a useful
question? Can we, and should we, pretend to be able to
forecast the future economic costs of each technology, in each
scenario, with any reasonable accuracy? Or, even more
challenging, can we accurately forecast small cost differences
between two very different possible future scenarios involv-
ing very different mixes of technologies? If we cannot, can we
get a reasonable approximation of the likely net costs or
benefits of mitigating climate change, or not?
Finally, there are other serious problems with how Barker
[8] performs the meta-analysis of IAM results that further
undermine the validity of their results. One is how Barker
accounts for the presence, or absence, of a “constant cost
backstop technology” in each IAM. First, it is not clear if one
or more types of backstop technologies are being referenced.
Second, what is being backstopped? Liquid fuels, such as oil?
Electricity generation? The paper does not specify. Nor does
the paper specify the cost or price of the backstop energy
technology to which it refers and why it assumes the cost
to be constant. The answers to these questions about the7 The net cost might not exactly double because of subtle effects of non-
linearities in the model structure relevant to computing incremental cost
differences.
8 The issue as to whether relatively “insigniﬁcant” but theoretically
important independent variables should be retained in the ﬁnal equation
as reported is not relevant to the point we are making here.determination of the backstop dummy variable for use in the
regression analysis for each model in Barker's database would
probably significantly illuminate the multi-variate regression
results. For example, the price of the backstop technology
might have a strong influence on the overall macroeconomic
impact on GWP. If one backstop technology was a CO2-rich,
non-conventional oil product, the higher its price, the lower
the net cost of mitigation would be, since more low-carbon
technologies would be cheaper. Furthermore, the idea of a
model assuming the existence of a constant cost backstop
technology is, itself, fairly strange. For most energy resources,
the higher the demand for the resource, the higher its marginal
cost of supply becomes; therefore, the cost of a backstop
technology should not be constant. Thus, any well-structured
IAM should allow energy and technology prices to rise and fall
appropriately, as demand rises and falls.
This example of the kinds of questions raised by the
independent variables selected by Barker [8], and especially
by the cost- and price-related questions, illustrates the kinds
of questions and issues that arise relative to the use of many
of the other independent variables chosen for the regression
equation relied on in this meta-analysis. We conclude that
the Barker meta-analysis is an inadequate basis for the Stern
Review to have concluded anything about the magnitude of
the likely net costs of mitigating climate change over the long
run. This is especially true given the overly narrow range of
input technology cost assumptions used in most IAMs — in
fact, often each modeling team only uses a single set of cost
assumptions for each technology over the next 100 years.
Therefore, the Barker meta-analysis is based on an artificially
limited range of data points because each IAM relies on an overly
limited range of input assumptions. But all a meta-analysis like
this one, even if well-structured, can accomplish is to tell us
something, on average, about the group of models used to run the
designated scenarios, and not the likely cost results for actually
mitigating climate change.
5. The IPCC's Fourth Climate Change Assessment — 2007
For our purposes, the most relevant chapter in the IPCC's
Fourth Assessment is Chapter 3 of theWorking Group III report,
“Issues related tomitigation in the long term context” [1]. There,
the authors point out that “the costs of stabilization crucially
depend on the choice of the baseline, related technological
change and resulting baseline emissions; stabilization target
and level; and the portfolio of [mitigation] technologies
considered. … Additional factors include assumptions with
regard to the use of flexible [policy] instruments and with
respect to revenue recycling [of carbon taxes]” (page 172).
As a basis for analysis, the chapter uses the results of the
Energy Modeling Forum (EMF-21) scenarios and the Inno-
vation Modeling Comparison Project (IMCP) network scenar-
ios [7]. However, the authors note that “these new modeling
comparison activities are not [emphasis added] based on fully
harmonized baseline scenario assumptions, but rather on
‘modeler's choice’ scenarios” and that “further uncertainties
have been introduced due to different assumptions and
modeling approaches” (page 174). It is important to note that
Barker's meta-analysis of economic results included most, if
not all, of these scenarios as well [8, pages 18–20]. Chapter 3
also states that another difficulty in making analytically sound
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that the “information and documentation of the scenarios in the
literature varies considerably” (page 174),which is a niceway of
saying that important parameter values and model methodol-
ogies for running many scenarios were never well-documented
in the literature.9
Since our focus here is on the economic costs and benefits
of mitigating climate change, it is important to first point
out that, as the IPCC states, “there are different metrics
for reporting costs of emissions reductions, although most
models report them in macro-economic indicators, particu-
larly GDP losses” (page 172). That the results of different
model runs are reported in terms of different metrics adds to
the lack of clarity about how to interpret the net costs or
benefits of mitigating climate change in the literature, if
not to the uncertainty in the reported numbers themselves.
Changes in GDP in going from a baseline to a mitigation
scenario, in particular, do not only reflect the costs and
benefits of mitigating climate change, but also reflect many
complex related changes within the economy, e.g., rebound
effects for energy demand. Yet, the IPCC cites the net costs of
mitigation over the long run as one of the most important
results of Chapter 3. The reported results range from very
small net benefits to the statement that “GDP losses in the
lowest stabilization scenarios in the literature (445–535
ppmv CO2-equivalent) are generally below 5.5% by 2050”
(1, page 172).
Besides the uncertainty and confusion created by different
models using different metrics to report their net cost results,
another significant source of uncertainty is whether or not
models include estimates of the economic damage avoided by
mitigating climate change. In fact, as noted above, most IAMs do
not include estimates of net damages, a major omission if one
wants to give policymakers a clear and comprehensive view of
the economic trade-offs of mitigating climate change. Chapter 3
states, “Due to considerable uncertainties and difficulties in
quantifying non-market damages, it is difficult to estimate SCC
[social cost of carbon] with confidence. Results depend on a
large number of normative and empirical assumptions that are
not knownwith any certainty” (page 173). This is very likely the
main reason why most IAMs do not include estimates of
avoided damages when quantifying the net costs of mitigating
climate change, but one might make the same equally valid
statement about almost all the long-term input assumptions
these models make, as we have also stated above. Finally,
Chapter 3 of the IPCC report points out that another source of
uncertainty and inaccuracy in all the economic results is that for
the IAMs on which it relies, “the risk of climate feedbacks is
generally not included in the … analysis” (page 173). Despite
the fact that climate change will impact the reference or
baseline case more strongly than any mitigation case, the IPCC
does not take into account at all this differential impact on the
world economy in the future. However, these differential
impacts on metrics such as the GDP could be very substantial9 We have even found it to be difﬁcult or impossible to ﬁnd many key
input assumptions for the IAMs relied on in the research team websites. As
Barker [8] says, “many of the one-sector growth models are calibrated on
long-term growth paths, but few report any formal ﬁtting to historical data”
[8, page 9].and could even be larger than the impacts on GDP of attempting
to simply mitigate climate change.
How, then, in light of all these acknowledged profound
uncertainties, did the IPCC derive the net costs ofmitigation that
they report for comparison purposes, for different levels of
mitigation? And why does the IPCC believe it is reasonable to
report such uncertain results given the serious misinterpreta-
tions of these results that could occur? (Pearce et al. [12] also
address these key questions.) Section 3.2 describes how the
baseline scenarios were developed. Given that different model-
ing teams with different baseline scenarios assumed very wide
ranges of the key drivers of CO2 emissions, such as population
and GDP growth, the results for baseline CO2 emissions had
an enormous spread by 2100, from nearly 0 tonnes per year
to more than 200 G-tonnes per year. (Current levels of CO2
emissions are “only” about 30 G-tonnes per year. See Fig. 3.8 on
page 187 for the full spread.) Interestingly, the average results
for improvements in energy efficiency in the baseline scenarios
were about 1% per year, ranging from about 0.5% to 1.9% per
year depending on the model. As the report itself notes, “this
range implies a difference in total energy consumption in 2100
of more than 300% — indicating the importance of the
uncertainty associated with this ratio” (page 183).
Section 3.3 describes how the mitigation scenarios were
produced. Mitigation or abatement measures for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions include structural changes in the
energy system, fuel switching, greater use of low- or no-carbon
energy supplies such as nuclear generation of electricity and
carbon sequestration technologies, enhanced energy efficiency,
and changes in land use (pages 200–201). Fig. 3.20 provides an
interesting perspective on the relationship between the
cumulative CO2 emissions of the baseline cases, compared to
the same quantity for the mitigation scenarios for the pairs of
IAM runs analyzed in the IPCC report (page 201). (A “pair” of
scenarios is a mitigation scenario and the baseline scenario
from which it is derived.) The high degree of scatter observed
for the data points in this plot means that for any given total
amount of CO2 emissions in a baseline scenario, there is a very
wide range of emissions reductions and, therefore, of absolute
levels of emissions of the corresponding mitigation scenarios
analyzed by the IAM teams. This demonstrates that for the
same baseline level of emissions over the 100 years from 2000
to 2100, different IAMs and/or different sets of input assump-
tions lead to very different results for CO2 emissions from the
corresponding mitigation scenario in the different pairs of
scenarios. Thus, the high degree of scatter in Fig. 3.20 would
also lead to a high degree of scatter and uncertainty in the
incremental costs of mitigation, if these costs were also plotted
in a similar fashion.
Similarly, at a more detailed level of analysis, Fig. 3.21
provides a view of the changing relationship over time of the
relative impact of enhanced energy efficiency when com-
pared to the reduction of the carbon content of energy
supplies (page 202). Again, for any given radiative forcing
level (which is approximately the same as the expected
temperature increase), a very wide range of relative effects
exists. Thus, for some models and sets of input assumptions,
enhanced energy efficiency plays a much larger role in
reducing CO2 emissions in any given future year than the
use of low-carbon energy supplies. Since the average and
marginal costs of energy efficiency and low carbon-supply
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variation in their relative importance will also lead to
significant variation and uncertainty in the net costs and
benefits ofmitigating climate change for the exact same level of
radiative forcing. These results for four of thewell-known IAMs
are further broken down by type of technology in Fig. 3.23
(page 203). Here, we can see that even at this very detailed
level, eachmodel shows very different results for the amount of
CO2 reductions for the mitigation scenarios relative to the
baseline scenarios analyzed for every major CO2 abatement
technology separately. As the IPCC report states, “the differ-
ences between the models also emphasize the impact of
different assumptions and the associated uncertainty” on the
net CO2 emissions (page 202).
Section 3.3.5.3 of the Fourth IPCC Assessment report
specifically addresses the issue of the “stabilization” or
mitigation cost results that derive from the many pairs of
baseline/mitigation scenarios analyzed. Again, the report
stresses that the economic results are given in three different
metrics depending on the IAM used: GDP losses, the net
present value of abatement costs, and carbon prices. These
cost results are presented separately for each output metric,
as they should be, in Fig. 3.25 (page 205). This figure shows
the relationship between the net costs, as measured by each
of the three different metrics, and the stabilization targets or
“categories.” (A stabilization “category” represents a fairly
narrow range of expected temperature increases over the
long run.) Again, we find a wide range of economic results for
any given stabilization category, especially for the lower
categories that represent stronger levels of mitigation. For
example, for the strictest mitigation categories I and II, the
net long-run economic results for each of the three metrics
can vary by factors of 5–10, or more. Thus, the IPCC analysis
indicates that depending on the IAM used and the set of cost
and price assumptions input to each IAM for any single
scenario, the net costs or benefits of mitigating climate change
are projected to vary widely, even when the results are segregated
both by the type of economicmetric reported and the likely impact
on the climate of the mitigation scenario.
Finally, the IPCC report provides a summary of the
quantitative economic results for mitigation categories I and
II. It finds that “[the cumulative global] GDP losses of the
lowest stabilization categories (I & II) are generally below
5.5% by 2050, however the number of studies are relatively
limited and in these scenarios stabilization is achieved predom-
inantly from low baselines. The absolute GDP loss numbers for
2050 reported above correspond on average to a reduction of
the annual GDP growth rate of less than … 0.12 percentage
points for the categories… I & II…” (page 206). (Note again, that
the cumulative 5.5% reduction in GDP by 2050 is claimed by the
IPCC to translate into an annual average reduction of only about
0.12% in each year from 2000 to 2050.) This statement implies
that out of an annual average GDP growth rate of, perhaps, 2.0
or 2.5% projected throughout the 21st century, the change in
GDP due to climate change mitigation could be measured, on
average, as precisely as 0.12 percentage points per year for
50 years.
Yet given all the uncertainties and variability in the
economic results of the IAMs, especially for category I and II
results, the claimed high degree of accuracy in GDP loss
projections is highly implausible. After all, economists cannotusually forecast the GDP of a single country for one year into
the future with such a high accuracy, never mind for the
entire world for 50 years, or more. We must conclude from
the results cited by the IPCC itself that projecting GDP losses
due to mitigating climate change to be below 5.5% cumula-
tively by 2050 is quite unknowable to any reasonable degree
of accuracy especially in light of the huge uncertainties that
exist for each input parameter that this argument does not
even take into account.
If one compares the basic results for the net long-run costs
of mitigation between the 2007 IPCC report and the Stern
Report, the similarity in these results is not surprising, since
the set of IAM runs analyzed in the Stern and IPCC reports
substantially overlap. However, it is not at all clear why the
IPCC Chapter 3 co-authors appear to believe that the results
as presented in Fig. 3.25 represented a reasonably complete
range of results, given the many uncertainties involved in
making such estimates that they do not even model. The
range over which most economic results happen to cluster
based on the input assumptions chosen by various IAM
research teams does not necessarily reflect the most likely
range of values for the results. Problematically, the IPCC
never attempted to present or analyze the actual ranges
for different input assumptions the IAMs actually utilized
to determine if a reasonably robust range for each parameter
(of hundreds) had been relied on. Without analyzing the
uncertainty in each type of individual input assumption, one
cannot reasonably conclude that the results of the model runs
do or do not represent a full range of uncertainty with respect
to the possible economic costs and benefits of mitigating
climate change, even if one assumes that the models were
accurate within these ranges of input assumptions. However,
based on our own limited review of many of the input
assumptions on which different IAMs relied, the results did
not come close to representing a reasonable range for each type
of important input assumption. Thus, simply relying on the
range of economic results themodeling teams just happened to
choose to produce is not a scientific and systematic method-
ology for developing evidence relevant to the economics of
mitigating climate change.
Perhaps, however, some may deem our fundamental
criticism of 100-year IAM-based economic forecasts for
mitigation, namely, that they could not possibly be known
to any reasonable standard of accuracy to be reported, unfair.
Some may contend that even if the GDP of the baseline
scenario cannot be accurately forecast in the long run, the
increment to GDP due solely to mitigating climate change still
could be predicted to a higher degree of accuracy because the
net cost of mitigation is fairly constant when averaged over
different baseline scenarios having different underlying GDP
growth rates. Unfortunately, Fig. 3.20, as discussed, appears
to undermine that possible defense, since it shows that for
baselines with similar cumulative CO2 emissions (which often
correlate to similar GDP levels over the long run), the
cumulative emissions reductions due to mitigation often vary
enormously. Thus, the incremental costs of mitigation are also
likely to vary widely for the same baseline emissions trajectory
depending on the model utilized, since the incremental costs
amount to roughly the amount of CO2 reduction required times
the average cost of mitigating a unit of CO2 emission, both of
which vary greatly. This means that the IPCC reported results
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completely undermines the idea that incremental GDP costs
would be fairly constant for all baselines and, therefore, could
be accurately predicted. Furthermore, the net costs of mitiga-
tion as reported by the IPCC do not take into account a vast
array of additional uncertainties described above.
6. Conclusions about methodologies for estimating
the mitigation costs of climate change from more
recent literature
Beginning a discussion of the literature on the economics of
climate changemitigation, Barker [5] states that “studies which
investigate the costs of deep mitigation, e.g. more stringent
stabilization targets such as 450 ppm CO2-eq or lower, are very
scarce as these targets are generally considered to be infeasible”
[5, page 4]. This might have been considered true until 2007,
but in the last six years many more feasible, yet stringent,
mitigation scenarios have become available [3,4]. Technically
speaking, if a model cannot achieve a particularly stringent
mitigation level, the net costs of achieving it are infinite. But
that result seems a priori impossible in the current situation,
since it is not physically impossible to achieve stringent
mitigation targets beginning now. Thus, the so-called “infeasi-
bility” of a scenario, as sometimes cited in the literature, serves
as a warning that the economic model being used is too
restrictive and has significant flaws or faulty assumptions.
Barker [5] goes on to discuss a few specific model results that
would successfully achieve a 450 ppm CO2-eq target, or better,
by 2100. However, one of the key considerations motivating
this paper is the concern that either some IAMs are structured
inways that preclude limiting a temperature increase to 2 °C or
lower or thatmany, if not all, are structured inways that are not
able to yield reasonably accurate net cost or benefit results for
mitigating climate change to the 2° target, even in the short to
medium term.
Needless to say, if a justifiable consensus that the net costs to
the world economy of achieving the 2 °C target were strongly
positive existed, it would send a very negative message to
policy-makers and political actors who lean towards resisting
any significant actions to mitigate climate change anyway. This
is the basic political problem, besides maintaining scientific
honesty, that the IAM research community must consider
before reporting highly uncertain net cost results So, again,
where does the state of knowledge stand? Is it even possible to
conceive of creating an integrated assessmentmodel that could
provide a reasonably definitive answer to the question of
whether positive net costs, or net benefits, are likely to result
from mitigating climate change over the long run? Can the
research community even be expected to know under what
assumptions net costs would result and under what other
assumptions net benefits would result, given all the other
uncertainties and unknowable factors that arise when creating
IAMs and modeling the world economy under conditions of
vast technological change that would occur over such a long
time period?
It is important to recognize that Barker's [5] findings, no
more than those of the Barker [8] findings, do not contribute
any support to the idea thatwe can estimate, with a fair degree
of accuracy, the net costs of mitigating climate change to any
particular level, and specifically to the 2 °C target [5]. The 2007paper begins with the observation that “it is important at the
outset to emphasize that the uncertainty about the cost
estimates increases for lower stabilization targets, namely
[those] targets at 450 ppm CO2-eq and below” [5, page 3]. It
continues, “The inherent uncertainty of costs becomes more
pronounced because there are few underlying studies that
address the economics of land use and new technologies …
that are required for the task [of mitigation].” “These new
technologies are inherently speculative… andwith very limited
experience of costs” (page 3). In the 2006 report, regarding the
types of macroeconomic modules within IAMs, Barker also
commented that “one of the most serious weaknesses is the
assumption in all the models, except E3MG, that the world
economy is at full employment in the base year and in most
models throughout the projection [period]” [8, page 13]. As
Barker notes, the assumption of full employment is untrue, and
wewould add it is not ever likely to be true for anymajor region
of the world for very long, if ever.
Thus, we cannot know whether IAMs can produce even
roughly approximate results based on how they model invest-
ments in new energy-related supply or demand technologies in
each key sector of the economy. This is particularly true when
investors and consumers in each sector have a wide range of
choices in new demand-side equipment which operate at
different levels of efficiency. In fact, we can find no literature
comparing investment decisions for energy-consuming equip-
ment implicit in IAMs with real-world trends in the past. Part of
the problemwith even attempting such an analysis is that at the
global level, almost all, if not all, IAMs treat the major sectors of
the economy in such an aggregate fashion that it is never
clear which new end-use technologies are accounting for the
investments calculated by themodels. Many IAMs have only one
equation each for representing energy use in the residential
building, commercial building, industrial, and transportation
sectors though some models incorporate a limited degree of
disaggregation. Because of the use of a single equation for a
sector, changes in the technologies used in the future in that
sector (however defined) cannot be identified explicitly. For
example, with a single equation for passenger travel in vehicles,
one cannot tell the difference between a trend towards the use of
more efficient gasoline engines in cars and switching from
gasoline engines to electric vehicles.
7. Energy efﬁciency and the EMF #25 study
The uncertainty in how investments are made in new
energy-consuming technologies applies equally to major
investments in entire new office buildings, new factories, or
new cars. The carbon emissions for any single new invest-
ment could easily vary by factors of 20%, 40%, or even more,
with respect to older alternatives, especially in the transpor-
tation sector. Consequently, the greenhouse gas emissions
consequences of investments in new energy-consuming
technologies in even a base case or reference case would be
highly uncertain, unless each new technology, in each year,
could be precisely specified. The emissions consequences of
investments in new energy-consuming equipment and facili-
ties, given changing consumption patterns, in a mitigation
scenario would be even more uncertain.
Most IAMs are very simplistic in their treatments of
technological change by assuming nearly exact continuity of
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case for the future, often assuming an average decrease in
energy use of about 1.2% per dollar of GDP per year when
averaged over all sectors of the economy.10 Building off that
underlying historical trend, one critical question is how
prominent IAMs account for energy efficiency improvements
(and the investment decisions leading to such improve-
ments) in climate change mitigation scenarios relative to the
underlying reference case. This is an important issue because
enhanced energy efficiency is usually the first policy priority in
real-world planning to mitigate climate change. Therefore, the
net costs or benefits of investments in enhanced energy-efficient
equipment for building shells, factories, etc., may prove to be
either the largest or second-largest contributor to the net costs
and benefits of overall climate change mitigation as measured
by theGWP, or othermetrics. (The costs or benefits of changing
the fossil fuel-based sources of energy to renewable energy
sources are the other major contributor to changes in GWP.)
The recent literature on the economics of climate change
contains almost no papers or reports that review the details
of how IAMs treat investments in enhanced energy efficiency
and the impact on energy consumption of changing lifestyles.
This is also true for the IPCC's Fourth Climate Assessment, as
well as for the Stern Review, which, as noted, primarily relied
on the Barker [8] analysis that the Review commissioned. And,
surprisingly, even though the Barker [8] analysis claimed to
focus on induced technological change as a new contribution to
the literature, it barely mentioned enhanced energy efficiency
as a type of such induced technological change and did not
analyze it in appropriate detail.
However, one major exception to this void in the
literature stands out: “Energy Efficiency and Climate Change
Mitigation,” a major study done by the Energy Modeling
Forum (EMF) project #25 [7]. In fact, this project likely began
in 2009 because of such widespread neglect of the topic of
enhanced energy efficiency. (Note that this was fully two
years after the publication of the most recent IPCC assess-
ment.) The EMF project #25 led to both a March 2011 report
and a much longer set of articles published as Volume 32 of
The Energy Journal in October 2011 [7,19]. More than 50
energy and climate modelers and analysts, covering mem-
bers of most of the climate change-related IAM modeling
teams throughout the world, participated in this project.
Although this project focused solely on the United States,
it relied on the same basic methodologies used to model the
economics of climate change worldwide. EMF #25 analyzed
the results from 10 different IAMs run for the United States.
Here, we will focus on the analysis presented in the March
2011 report [7]. The “highlights” section of that report noted
that some IAMs used for the study had an explicit treatment
of some options (new technologies) for energy efficiency,
while others relied more on “market responses and economic
equilibrium” (page ix). In addition, the highlights noted, “Other
structural model features, parameter values and assumptions
about key conditioning factors appear to be primary contrib-
utors to differences in model outcomes” (page ix). Finally, one
of the study's main conclusions was that “improvements are10 This is not surprising in light of the fact that the coefﬁcients in most
models are ﬁt by statistical means to historic data.required to make themodels more useful for policymaking” on
energy efficiency (page ix).
As noted, enhanced energy efficiency is a very important
form of induced technological change for climate change
mitigation because it is often very cost-effective for investors,
i.e., it has positive net economic benefits prior to consider-
ation of any economy-wide rebound effects. This reflects the
fact that the energy system is not currently close to a state of
economic equilibrium, in part because the world has substan-
tially under-invested in enhanced energy efficiency in the past.
Thus, the more they are available, and the cheaper new
energy-efficient technologies become, the more likely the net
costs of mitigating climate change as a whole will be negative,
i.e., there will be net benefits. New lifestyle patterns can
accentuate these effects.
However, many of the IAMs that have been run for past
IPCC climate assessments and many included in the Barker
[8] database do not model energy efficiency well, either in
terms of its direct impacts on the energy system or in terms
of the way new investments in energy efficiency impact the
GWP. In the extreme case, some climate-related IAMs do not
even allow for an increased level of energy efficiency in the
mitigation scenarios relative to the baseline or reference
scenarios, except implicit changes due to energy price elasticity
impacts. In these mitigation model runs, it is not clear if
there are increased investments in energy efficiency that
impact GWP or GDP calculations, and the models' overly rigid
structures preclude mitigating climate change by enhancing
energy efficiency from the start.
In model runs where the amount of energy efficiency is
allowed to increase in the mitigation scenarios relative to the
reference scenarios, the maximum level of increased energy
efficiency often seems to be capped at about 0.5% per year, or
less, in energy units per dollar of real GDP. This means that
the entire economy cannot improve its energy efficiency by
more than about 0.5% per year, usually starting from an
approximate baseline a 1.2% per year increase in efficiency
per dollar of GDP, which reflects the actual trend over the last
several decades. The maximum rate of energy efficiency
improvement averaged throughout the economy is, then,
only about 1.7% per year, or less, in many climate mitigation
scenarios. In contrast, even the fairly cautious International
Energy Agency has supported policies to increase the level of
energy efficiency improvements to about 2.5% per year from
2009 to 2035 in the “450 Scenario” in their 2011 annual
report, and many environmental organizations argue that
similar rates of improvement are possible and necessary
[20,21]. Even higher rates of improvement are possible from
an engineering perspective.
Evidentiary support for our earlier observation that most
IAMs over-constrain the amount of enhanced energy effi-
ciency allowed to occur in mitigation scenarios comes
directly from the EMF #25 study. Again, some of the 10
models on which it relied were general equilibrium models
with very limited technology detail for end-use sectors. Some
other models had more end-use technological detail, but
instead of assuming that consumers always purchased the
lowest-cost and most energy-efficient options, those models
often constrained adoption rates for new, more efficient
technologies to be consistent with “people's actual behavior,”
however so determined (page 1). For the EMF #25 study,
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models for any given scenario, e.g., oil prices and the U.S. GDP
growth path. But other input assumptions varied “sharply”
such as “non-petroleum fuel prices and the costs and
availability of electricity generation sources,” causing the
results to vary significantly from one model to another
(page 3). The study does not explain why it chose not to
harmonize these input assumptions as well. Having many key
cost assumptions vary betweenmodels for the “same” scenario
makes comparing the results of the model runs, as the study
tried to do, potentially meaningless, since it is not clear what
can be learned about the models themselves unless the results
are somehow “corrected” or adjusted for the differences in
input assumptions, of which there are hundreds.
Fig. 2 in the EMF#25 report shows the average impact on all
the model results due to a modest $80 per tonne of CO2
“carbon” tax by 2030, using 2005 as the base year. The energy
“intensity” line in this figure illustrates the impact of additional
energy efficiency improvements stimulated by the carbon tax
throughout the economy. These incremental improvements
in energy efficiency in the mitigation case relative to those
implicit in the reference cases equal at most 0.5% per year (see
page 3— the change is about a cumulative 10 percentage point
improvement over 25 years). An even smaller average level of
incremental energy efficiency—namely, a cumulative 7 per-
centage point improvement over 25 years, or about 0.3% per
year—appears for the residential sector in isolation in Fig. 10.
When averaged over all the models, this figure hides the fact
(illustrated in Fig. 10) that the individual model results range
from a 2% to a 10 percentage point improvement due to
the carbon tax, a factor of 5 difference, which is a very
large range given that it involves only one sector (residential)
of the economy in only one country (the United States). Note
that Fig. 10 clearly identifies the energy efficiency improve-
ment implicit in the reference case as a cumulative average of
about 13 percentage points over 25 years, or only about 0.6%
per year. Thus, the impact of the carbon tax seems to exhibit
some degree of diminishing returns or increasing model-
related constraints relative to actual historical trends for
reasons that are not discussed.
Figs. 11, 12, and 13 show that the incremental energy
efficiency improvements average somewhat less than 7 per-
centage points over 25 years for the commercial, industrial, and
transportation sectors, respectively, because of the carbon tax.11
Similarly, the variation in model results for each of these other
sectors is as large as, if not larger than, the variation between
results from different models for the residential sector.
Interestingly, after the disaggregation of the average energy
efficiency enhancement results into separate averages for the
economic equilibrium models and the “process-economic”
models, the efficiency improvements were clearly higher, on
average, for the economic equilibrium sub-group.
What is the implication, then, of the results of the most
intensive model comparison exercise ever to focus on energy
efficiency for mitigating climate change, namely the EMF #25
study? The same modest carbon tax trajectory used in all
the model runs was only sufficient to induce incremental
efficiency improvements of about 0.5% per year through11 Most IAMs only disaggregate the economy into these three sectors in
addition to the residential sector.2030, compared to the International Energy Agency recom-
mended incremental target of about 1.2% per year.12 This is
a very big difference relative to the IEA recommended level,
especially if it is projected far into the future. This 0.7
percentage points per year difference amounts to about a
cumulative 50% reduction in energy use by 2100 relative to
2005. Such a 50% reduction would clearly make the total
costs of mitigating climate change far lower.
More importantly, for our purposes of trying to assess the
current state of art for the economic analysis of mitigating
climate change, the results of EMF #25 suggest that since the
net reduction in energy demand in the United States, by
sector and in total, varied so significantly from model to
model for the same carbon tax, either the variance in the
other input assumptions besides the carbon tax must have
also been significantly different from model to model. Or, the
models have such fundamentally different structures, that
most models must be highly flawed. This implies that the net
long-run costs or benefits of mitigating climate change via
implementation of the same carbon tax would also vary
tremendously from model to model, though those results
were not reported. In fact, there is no way to tell from the
EMF #25 report whether the implementation of the very
modest incremental levels of energy efficiency actually
achieved in the mitigation scenarios run would yield net
benefits or net costs to the economy. In summary, then, either
the model structures, the many implicit input assumptions
such as the costs of energy efficiency-enhancing technologies,
or both were so different frommodel to model that the impact
on GWP of mitigating climate change via this critical “tech fix”
approach would itself be highly variable and indeterminate.
8. The other major determinant of net mitigation costs
or beneﬁts
As noted above, the other major component of the cost of
mitigating climate change stems from de-carbonizing the
energy supply sector. This includes the electricity, liquid
fuel, solid fuel, and the gaseous fuel sectors. Examples on the
cost side of the equation are the cost of new wind turbines or
solar cells to generate electricity and the cost of advanced
biofuels for jet aircraft. The savings of converting to renewable
energy in these supply sectors come from the displacement of
fossil fuel-based electricity and traditional kerosene for aircraft
engines, respectively. Again, the net benefit of mitigation
derives from the difference between these two sets of costs,
though we must also consider the “rebound” effect when
calculating the magnitude of the overall macro-economic
benefits. (If the net benefits are negative (net costs), the
rebound effect will tend to show lower energy demand in the
remainder of the economy, and vice versa.) In theory, one of
the virtues of having macroeconomic modules as part of IAMs
is the ability to compute the impacts of trade-offs, such as the
rebound effect, within the economy. But an unresolved issue is
whether these existing macro-economic modules in IAMs are
at all accuratewhen attempting to compute the size of rebound
effects or similar economic trade-offs. The lack of knowledge of12 Whether a much higher carbon tax trajectory would have achieved a
result in the EMF #25 study much closer to 1.2% per year cannot be
determined from the study's results.
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between reference case andmitigation case scenarios is another
major source of uncertainty in attempts to determine the net
mitigation costs.
9. “Pushing the Boundaries of Climate Economics” — a
new analysis
Recently, a new article appeared in the literature on the
economic modeling of mitigating climate change that also
raises “critical issues to consider in climate policy analysis”
[22]. Interestingly, one of the co-authors of this new article is
Terry Barker, the lead author of the two meta-analyses that
have been discussed above.13 From the start, this article points
out that “the ‘cost’ of climate policy is not an observable
market price; rather, it is a construct shaped by the modeling
apparatus and its explicit and implicit assumptions. … As in
any economic modeling, the future macro-level assumptions
driving the analysis have important implications for the costs
and impacts of climate policy” (page 156).
The authors of this new article then proceed to make a
controversial claim with which we agree: that “baseline
assumptions employed in modeling studies are often arbitrary
and inconsistent with each other, particularly when projections
are taken off the shelf from different sources. A complete model
of climate policy costs and impacts should, in theory, make
some of these data endogenous; climate damages can affect the
rate of (business as usual) growth of per capita incomes; climate
policies can change the price of oil” (page 156). But, as this
article points out, creating such a model is difficult because it
would have to be very complex— in our view, farmore complex
than existing IAMs. The article likewise notes, “Beyond the
universal dilemmas of modeling uncertain futures, the econom-
ics of climate change poses unique challenges to orthodox styles
of economic analysis. There are four fundamental requirements
for an adequate economic framework for climate policy
[modeling].” We stress two of the requirements listed, namely
the “incorporation of multi-dimensional, often un-monetisable
impacts, rendering cost–benefit analysis problematical,” and
“recognition of the problems of catastrophic risks and irreduc-
ible uncertainty, leading to a precautionary approach to policy”
(page 157). For example, in a baseline scenario, the world may
run short of fossil fuels so quickly that fuel prices could
skyrocket, causing the global economy to crash. No existing
climate-related IAM can capture such an effect, despite its very
real possibility.
In their discussion of risk and uncertainty, the authors
further point out that trying to reduce the uncertainty in key
inputs to IAMs “is not helpful in the face of catastrophic risks
and deeply uncertain probabilities of worst-case scenarios.…
Economies are highly complex non-linear systems and it is
impossible [emphasis added] to accurately predict their future
evolution” (page 157). The authors conclude that “climate
economic analysis would need to cover the entire spectrum of
uncertainty ranging from unknown uncertainty (variations
around expected system behavior that cannot be quantified) to
uncertainties that can be quantified” (page 157). We would
add that it is not at all clear what kinds of uncertainties for13 Full disclosure: another co-author of this article used to work with Dr.
Rosen at the Tellus Institute.input assumptions into IAMs could be quantified over the
time periods as long as those assumed by our discussion, i.e.
50–100 years.
Finally, Scrieciu et al. [22] has a very interesting and useful
discussion of induced technological change (ITC) in Section 3,
which includes the modeling of enhanced energy efficiency.
Here, the authors exactly echo several of our points in stating
that some “economic models for climate policy may not
include ITC at all, or include it with restrictive assumptions
and in a partial form so that it has only weak effects.
Furthermore, the models may not include all the policy
instruments that affect ITC. In consequence, the results of the
models exaggerate, from this perspective, the costs of
mitigation and give the impression that stringent mitigation
is not possible without economic collapse” [22, page 158].
The possibility of infeasibility might even apply to the existing
economic system as it has behaved in the past, but it does not
take into account the many positive impacts and flexibility
that changing consumption, technology policies, and lifestyle
patterns could provide to allow for the feasibility of the strictest
mitigation of climate change.
10. Conclusions and policy implications
We have suggested that there are numerous reasons to
believe that the net cumulative benefits or costs of mitigating
climate change are, in fact, unknowable for a period as long
as 50–100 years, especially for the purpose of basing any
climate change mitigation policy decisions on such calcula-
tions. In summary, those reasons are the following:
1. It is not possible to foretell the emissions trajectory of a
reference or base case that assumes that no additional
climate change mitigation policies are adopted, since
forecasting the future of the energy/land-use economy
over 50–100 years cannot be done to any relevant degree
of accuracy. Thus, it is not at all clear what reference case
costs one could validly compare to any mitigation scenario
costs. In addition, the impact of climate change itself on
the economy, land, ecosystems, and water is not typically
modeled, yet these impacts would be significant.
2. The mathematical structure of most integrated assessment
models is far too aggregate on the demand or energy-
consumption side to forecast even a reference case with
any reasonable accuracy. And such an aggregate structure
cannot adequately quantify changes to the cost of new and
existing technologies in a stringent mitigation scenario. The
current structure of most, if not all, integrated assessment
models (IAMs) is not even capable of forecasting changes in
energy efficiencywithin themajor sectors of the economy to
any reasonable level of inter-model agreement, or agree-
ment with “bottom-up” efficiency studies.
3. The neo-classical economic basis of most of the macro-
economic modules contained within IAMs, as well as the
micro-economic optimization methodology of many, has
been strongly challenged by many economists as being
inappropriate for forecasting the future of the world
economy over long periods. In addition, these models do
not even treat the financial sector of the economy explicitly
and, thus, cannot predict financial problems caused by the
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may impact long-term GDP growth.
4. It is impossible to forecast what kinds of low-carbon supply
technologies may be invented in the future nor how the
efficiencies and costs of current low- or no-carbon technol-
ogies may change over the next century in both a reference
case and, separately, in a mitigation case. All these unknow-
able technology parameters will significantly affect net
mitigation benefits and costs, especially for new technolo-
gies such as biomass-based carbon sequestration, on which
many climatemitigation scenarios strongly rely. The same is
true for forecasting fossil fuel prices and quantities available
over the next 100 years.
5. No adequate inter-model comparison studies of either
relevant reference cases or mitigation scenarios have been
carried out with the quantitative input assumptions for
the same scenario harmonized across all models to the
extent allowed by their different structures. Because of
differences in model structures, or in input assumptions,
the IAM research community does not even know to what
extent differences in economic results for the “same”
mitigation or reference cases exist between models
because of their differing structures alone. Thus far, the
differences between results produced by different IAMs
for the “same” scenarios reported in the literature have
been substantial, even when a few key input parameters
such as GDP and population growth have been harmo-
nized in some inter-model comparison studies.
6. Many different model results for the “same” or similar
mitigation scenarios appear to differ significantly because
of the different climate mitigation policies modeled and
different structural ways of modeling these policies. The
IAM research community has not yet developed and
agreed upon a uniform or harmonized way of modeling
climate mitigation policies. In addition, most IAMs cannot
even model many important climate change mitigation
policies, such as mode shifting within the transportation
sector, because the IAM structures are too aggregate.
7. Mitigation scenarios omit many types of costs, such as
transaction costs, and most IAMs do not even include
avoided climate-induced damage costs in mitigation sce-
narios as a benefit. This is inexcusable since both types of
costs could be very substantial over 50–100 years [15]. In
addition, there is substantial controversy over what dis-
count rate is appropriate for long-run economic studies.
While that issue has not been a focus of our analysis, the
discount rate has a substantial effect on the numerical value
of cumulative net economic benefits over the long runwhen
expressed on a present value basis.
8. It is not appropriate to perform statistical meta-analyses
on a database comprised of an arbitrary set of IAM model
results, especially when the results are based on very
restricted ranges of model input assumptions and struc-
tural parameters. In addition, it is not clear what one could
learn from such an analysis, in part because each data
point receives equal weight in the meta-analysis. Thus,
whichever IAMproduced themost scenario results included
in the database will influence the results of the meta-
analysis the most for no good reason.
9. Since theWestern lifestyle can probably not serve as a role
model for the life styles of the nine billion people likely toinhabit our planet by 2050, significant but unpredictable
changes to consumption and production patterns not
incorporated in existing IAMs are likely to occur, adding
another layer of uncertainty to the economic calculations
made by these IAMs for the net costs and benefits of
mitigating climate change.
For the reasons cited above, not only do we not know the
approximate magnitude of the net benefits or costs of
mitigating climate change to any specific level of future global
temperature increase over the next 50–100 years, but we also
cannot even claim to know the sign of the mitigation impacts
on GWP, or national GDPs, or any other economic metric
commonly computed. Thus, the IPCC and other scientific bodies
should no longer report attempts at calculating the net
economic impacts of mitigating climate change to the public
in their reports. Since most other aspects of reference and
mitigation case scenario results depend entirely on the
economic trade-offs modeled, they should not be reported
either.
Contrary to the claims of scientists who are well aware of
the many uncertainties in modeling the economic impact
of mitigating climate change, reporting and analyzing the
results of existing IAM Scenarios is not useful because even
the simplest comparison of model results yields meaningless
results — the uncertainties are too profound [12,16,17]. For
example, Pearce et al. [12] list three ways in which IAM
analyses over the long run are “valuable” (page 4) in spite of
the paper's clear presentation of the uncertainties in model
results: (1) internal consistency in any given model allows
one to assess the relative implication of policy alternatives,
(2) some “rough bounds” on mitigation costs are apparent,
and (3) modeling can help estimate which policy architec-
tures are likely to lead to lower versus higher costs. (Note
that point #3 is basically the same as point #1.)
Our response to points #1 and #3 is twofold. First, it is
usually clear just based on simple mathematical reasoning
what the qualitative effect of various policy alternatives will
be on climate change mitigation costs and benefits. Thus, no
model runs are usually necessary at all. Secondly, most if not
all currently existing IAM can analyze only one or two simple
mitigation policies, e.g., a carbon tax, so policy analysis is
usually impossible for most policy alternatives because of a
lack of disaggregation in the models. Finally, our response to
point #2 above is that learning the rough trends of costs is
not credible given that we cannot even know the sign of the
cumulative net costs over the long run, so there may be large
net benefits rather than costs if realistic assumptions were
input. One can also perform relatively simple spreadsheet
analysis to get rough trends on cost, but doing so would not
help to inform the world what to do if we cannot know just
the sign of the likely outcome. We believe that Pearce et al.
[12] wanted to water down their conclusions based on their
own excellent analysis in order not to overly upset the IAM
research community, with which they work closely.
The final question is, should these findings and conclu-
sions about the inadequacies of current IAMs really matter
to policymakers who are trying to figure out when, and to
what extent, to implement effective climate change mitiga-
tion policies? Our answer is “no,” because humanity would
be wise to mitigate climate change as quickly as possible
106 R.A. Rosen, E. Guenther / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 91 (2015) 93–106without being constrained by existing economic systems
and institutions, or risk making the world uninhabitable. This
conclusion is clear from a strictly physical and ecological
perspective, independent of previously projected economic
trade-offs over the long run, and it is well-documented in the
climate change literature. As climate scientists constantly
remind us, even if the world successfully implemented a
substantial mitigation program today, a much warmer world
is already built into the physical climate system. And since
we can never know what the cost of a hypothetical reference
case would be, and since we must proceed with a robust
mitigation scenario, we will never be able to determine the
net economic benefits of mitigating climate change, even in
hindsight. Going forward, the key economic issue on which
policymakers (and IAM research teams) should focus is how
to implement as cost-effective and stringent a mitigation
scenario as possible in the short to medium term, with
periodic adjustments to such a plan. Making realistic plans to
mitigate climate change decade by decade requires much
more specialized and detailed sectoral planning models than
the current IAMs to carry out least cost/maximum benefit
planning in each sector of the economy in order to create
hopeful, normative mitigation scenarios.
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